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Abstract We present an algorithm that can anticipate tax evasion by modeling the
co-evolution of tax schemes with auditing policies. Malicious tax non-compliance,
or evasion, accounts for billions of lost revenue each year. Unfortunately when tax
administrators change the tax laws or auditing procedures to eliminate known
fraudulent schemes another potentially more profitable scheme takes it place.
Modeling both the tax schemes and auditing policies within a single framework can
therefore provide major advantages. In particular we can explore the likely forms of
tax schemes in response to changes in audit policies. This can serve as an early
warning system to help focus enforcement efforts. In addition, the audit policies can
be fine tuned to help improve tax scheme detection. We demonstrate our approach
using the iBOB tax scheme and show it can capture the co-evolution between tax
evasion and audit policy. Our experiments shows the expected oscillatory behavior
of a biological co-evolving system.
Keywords Tax evasion  Co-evolution  Grammatical evolution  Genetic
algorithms  Auditing policy  Partnership tax
1 Introduction
The 2006 U.S. gross tax gap, i.e. the difference between the tax owed and the tax
paid on time, was estimated at $450 billion (IRS 2006). The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) further estimates that $91 billion of this tax gap can
be attributed to income hidden in tax shelters composed of multiple ‘‘pass-through’’
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entities, such as partnerships, S corporations and trusts (GAO 2014a). Financial and
legal enterprises scour the tax code in search of ambiguities in order to discover and
promote abusive tax shelters. Such illegal tax avoidance strategies use complex
transactions within networks of tax entities that are designed to reduce and obscure
the tax liabilities for their individual shareholders. For the purpose of discussion
here we categorize such sequences of transactions as ’tax evasion schemes’ in
contrast to legal tax avoidance strategies that adhere to the letter and intent of the
tax code.
While tax auditors have historical examples of tax schemes to help guide
examination efforts, tax shelter promoters often adapt their strategies as existing
schemes are uncovered and/or when changes are made to the existing tax
regulations. One notable example is the so called BOSS tax shelter (Bond and
Options Sales Strategies) that was widely promoted yet was ultimately disallowed.
While audit changes were implemented to detect BOSS they were not able to detect
the newly emerged variant ‘‘Son of BOSS’’ (Wright 2013). This is typical of the
arms race between tax evaders and tax auditors. The significant challenges posed for
enforcement efforts here have prompted recent congressional action to address some
ambiguities in partnership audit and adjustment rules (Accountancy 2015).
There remains however significant challenges to enforcement efforts that arise from
two primary sources. (a) the complexity of the tax code: tax law is not only qualitatively
difficult to parse from a natural language perspective, it is quite interconnected (Li
et al. 2015; Katz and Bommarito 2014) as can be quantified by the number of links
between paragraphs. Furthermore calculation of certain tax quantities can be
complicated and byzantine. For example, owners of a partnership need to adjust
separate basis values and use one of two similar definitions of ‘‘built-in substantial
income’’ as described by Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §734 and §743. (b) dispersed,
sensitive and obfuscated data: tax reporting data is distributed and fraudsters
purposely obscure their intentions. These individuals often obfuscate their schemes by
using large hierarchies of entities, e.g. up to 100 tiers and 100,000 partners (GAO
2014b), providing as little information as possible and stalling reporting data. The
auditors work with aggregated and dispersed tax data, e.g. on form 1065 (Schedule
K-1)1 many of which might be filed as separate paper attachments.
In this paper we describe a methodology that can help detect strategies for
reducing tax liability by offsetting real gains in one part of a portfolio by creating
artificial capital losses elsewhere, specifically those that utilize the complicated
partnership tax law in Subchapter K of the IRC. While there are other strategies for
abusive tax avoidance that involve related party agreements, services pricing, or
state and local tax (SALT) jurisdictional items, we consider partnership tax for this
initial analysis. The tax schemes here consist of sequences of transactions between
entities in ownership networks that, when taken individually, appear compliant.
However, when all transactions are combined they have no other purpose than to
illegally mitigate tax liability and can potentially be labeled as tax evasion.
Propitiously, it is possible to disallow tax evasion by one of many anti-abuse
doctrines, e.g. the ‘‘economic substance’’ doctrine, which specifies that transactions
1 http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-1065,-U.S.-Return-of-Partnership-Income.
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must contain both economic substance and a business purpose (Rostain and Regan
2014).
Tax auditors typically use protocols to rate whether an entity is suspicious
enough to undergo a full audit (Andreoni et al. 1998). Such a full audit is a thorough
investigation of the reported financial information to establish the correct tax
liability (IRS 2014a). Our goal is to develop algorithms that can model the co-
evolution of tax schemes as represented by networks of transactions with their
corresponding audit observables.
Our approach to detecting tax evasion places us in the realm of AI research and legal
reasoning that started in the 1970s (Buchanan and Headrick 1970). The field of AI and
law (Sartor and Rotolo 2013; Bench-Capon et al. 2012) deals with simulation of norms
and their emergence (Aubert and Mu¨ller 2013; Dechesne et al. 2013; Lotzmann et al.
2013). Pioneeringwork regarding taxes occurs in ‘‘Taxman’’ (McCarty 1977) andmore
recently in tax non-compliance modeling of real estate policy (Boer and Engers 2013).
Machine learning has recently emerged as a means of detecting suspicious transactions.
It relies upon known historical examples labeled to be compliant or non-compli-
ant (DeBarr andEyler-Walker 2006). The requirement of data labeled in thismanner for
training (Surden 2014; Ngai et al. 2011) limits the use of detection methods to identify
already known cases of abuse. Alternatively unsupervised techniques can be used to
cluster transactions based on their common resemblance. This requires a measure of
similarity between different transaction types as well as knowledge to classify a cluster
as abusive. In contrast our model does not require taxpayer data (it is similar to a
minmax search in a game of chess) and has the added advantage of alleviating any data
privacy concerns. The current paper specifically extends the prior efforts (Warner et al.
2014; Hemberg et al. 2015; Rosen et al. 2015) that describe tax evasion detection
through evolutionary search.
We proceed as follows in describing how our method Simulating Tax Evasion
and Law Through Heuristics (STEALTH) can be used to anticipate abusive tax
avoidance schemes. In Sect. 2 we begin with a background of the partnership tax
law fundamentals used in STEALTH and the related tax modeling literature. The
detailed methodology of how co-evolutionary heuristics can be used to search-and-
score tax schemes and audit plans is described in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we demonstrate
the capability of STEALTH to identify an artificial basis step-up tax scheme called
iBOB . Conclusions and future work are described in Sect. 5.
2 Background
We begin with a background of partnership tax law fundamentals and summarize
the existing literature on modeling tax evasion.
2.1 Asset taxation
We focus on taxes incurred during the sale and trade of investment property. While
an extensive set of rules apply to the calculation of taxes during such
transactions (IRS 2014b), we summarize below only the terms of most interest
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for our purposes: (a) Basis The original investment to acquire an asset, often times
its purchase price. Basis is used as the baseline against which to determine capital
gain or loss on asset disposition. Basis is also adjusted by any associated liabilities.
(b) Fair Market Value (FMV) The value of an asset at a given time. (c) Capital Gain
A capital gain results when an asset is disposed at a price higher than its adjusted
basis. Depending on how long the asset has been held, the capital gain is classified
as either long term (greater than 1 year) or short term (less than 1 year). Short term
capital gain is taxed at ordinary income rates. Long term capital gain is taxed at a
typically lower rate and varies with an individual’s filing status. (d) Capital Loss A
capital loss arises when an asset is disposed at price lower than its adjusted basis.
Similar to capital gains, capital losses are also classified as short or long term. If
capital losses exceed capital gains, the excess can be rolled across multiple years to
match capital gains in the future.
We elaborate some basic examples of basis, its adjustment and impact on taxable
gain or loss. An example of the use of basis to calculate capital gain is described below:
1. Purchase: 100 shares of IBM bought at $200 ? $100 commission. Basis is
$20,100 ($201/share).
2. Sale: 100 shares of IBM sold at $210 ? $100 commission.
3. Revenue: $20,900 ($209/share)
4. Capital gain: $20,900 - $20,100 = $800.
A taxpayer that incurs a loss from the sale of an asset can allocate that loss across
the rest of his portfolio to lower his tax liability from other capital gains that may
have been incurred. For example:
1. Taxpayer A owns a house with an FMV of $200k, in which taxpayer A has a
$120k basis.
2. When taxpayer A sells the house, a $80k capital gain is incurred.
3. Taxpayer A also owns a car with an FMV of $10k, in which taxpayer A has a
$30k basis.
4. Upon sale of the car, taxpayer A only has to pay tax on $60k because the capital
loss ($20k) from step 3 partially cancels the gain ($80k) from the house sale.
In some cases basis can be readjusted, for example during stock inheritance:
1. 100 shares IBM stock originally purchased for $4 in 1965
2. Inherited in 2013
3. Basis is ‘‘stepped-up’’ to market value on date of inheritance
4. Capital gain or loss is calculated as before on sale using the adjusted basis
2.1.1 Partnerships and carryover bases
Partnerships are legal tax entities that are governed by rules defined in sub-
chapter K, §701–777 of the IRC. While partnerships are required to file a tax return
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detailing their economic activity, they are not directly taxed. Instead, any
income/gain/loss is passed through to their immediate owners in proportion to
their ownership percentages. In order to determine the corresponding tax liability
for each of the partners, the basis of the original assets contributed to the partnership
must be tracked separately for both the inside basis – the part of the assets’ adjusted
basis that is attributable to each partner, and the outside basis – the basis each
partner holds in the partnership interest. Most times, the inside and outside basis will
match but can begin to differ when partnership interests are transferred. In order to
correct this mismatch, partnerships are allowed to adjust the inside basis of their
assets by making a special election known as the §754 election. This basis
adjustment can be made in the case of several scenarios, the two most common
being: (a) sale of a partnership interest (defined in IRC §743), and/or (b) distribution
of property (defined in IRC §734). Income, gain or loss calculation using adjusted
basis can become complicated when individuals form partnerships by pooling
resources (cash, property, labor) to conduct joint businesses. Individuals have been
found to disguise gains by conducting transactions across multiple tiers of nested
partnerships while claiming bogus §754 elections (Wright 2013).
2.2 Tax evasion modeling
Tax evasion can be considered a gamble like any other investment involving risk
and uncertainty (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). This insight forms the basis for
many agent based modeling approaches that divert from standard microeconomic
notions of tax evasion and instead consider the individual preferences of
heterogeneous actors or agents (Bloomquist 2006). For example, in one study
agents are either honest, imitative or free riders and a GA is used to update the
population of agents’ use of a utility function that determines the tax paying
behavior of the agent (Mittone and Patelli 2000). Tax compliance has also been
studied as an evolutionary coordination game (Bloomquist 2011). Another study
considered evolution of tax evasion (Lipatov 2003) by an agent based model using a
game theoretic approach. Cyclical behavior in compliance is seen here when the
audit probability is adjusted, but no guidance is provided on how to increase
compliance. In addition, attempts have been made to investigate how psychological
motives vary with different audit techniques (Davis et al. 2003; Hokamp and
Pickhardt 2010; Hokamp and Seibold 2014; Pickhardt and Prinz 2014). Econo-
physics models from statistical mechanics have also been considered, e.g. Ising
models have been used to model different social behavior and investigate thresholds
for efficient audits (Zaklan et al. 2009; Pickhardt and Seibold 2014; Zaklan et al.
2008). More recently, agent based models of tax compliance with varying social
network structure have been analyzed. For a given enforcement regime, an
environment with limited knowledge of neighbor payoffs appears to lead to higher
levels of aggregate compliance than when agents are aware of neighbor strategy
payoffs (Korobow et al. 2007). In addition, the effects of network topologies in the
propagation of evasive behavior is found important for tax compliance (Andrei
et al. 2013). Legal modeling approach of financial fraud was set up using Wigmore
charts, a graphical method for legal evidence, and ontologies (Kingston et al. 2004).
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Statistical machine learning techniques e.g. Decision Trees, Neural Networks,
Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines, both supervised and unsupervised,
have also been used for fraud detections (Kallio and Back 2011; Bonchi et al. 1999;
Jaideep and Bjorklund 2009). Notable work here by (DeBarr and Eyler-Walker
2006) used Support Vector Machines to detect tax shelters. The kernel based
analysis used here identifies groups of taxpayers who appear to be participating in a
tax shelter promoted by a common financial advisor. This analysis task requires
estimating risk, a weighted combination of both the likelihood of abuse and the
potential revenue losses. It should also be noted that statistical machine learning is
applied to e-Discovery (Oard and Webber 2013) in order to retrieve similar
documents.
Unlike in prior research, the STEALTH approach described here considers a tax
evasion scheme as the unit of interest rather than an individual agents behavior. In
STEALTH there are no pre-defined labels of tax evasion schemes or similarity
metrics, and no modeling of assumed psychological behavior. There is no need for
data, labeled or unlabeled. Instead a scoring function is derived that is able to rank
the ’fitness’ of different tax schemes subject to varying audit risk. We investigate
how to reveal unknown schemes starting at the discrete transaction level. The
research gap STEALTH contributes to here is the quantitative modeling of
partnership tax law and the representation of partnership transactions and
corresponding audit risk. These topics are elaborated upon next.
3 STEALTH : a method for identifying tax schemes
The STEALTH approach to the challenges of tax evasion detection is characterized
across the multiple levels shown in Fig. 1: (a) the conceptual level with tax evaders
and auditors, (b) the model level of the tax ecosystem, with the representation of tax
schemes and audit score sheets, here we use decision tree rules to represent the tax
law, (c) the simulation level that processes a transaction sequence and outputs
deductible loss and audit scores, and (d) the optimization level that searches
transaction sequences based on audit risk. These levels are described in more detail
Fig. 1 Description of levels in STEALTH
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below. For reference, Table 1 provides an overview of some important terms used
in STEALTH . For additional formalism of these levels see Appendix 6.
3.1 STEALTH model of tax evasion
We break down the tax ecosystem into three fundamental components; tax entities
(e.g. taxpayers, partnerships) their assets (e.g. cash, real-estate, securities) and the
corresponding transactions that occur amongst them. In broad terms, tax laws
govern interactions between entities and specify any resulting tax liability that
might occur as a result of a transaction. In practice adherence to tax laws is verified
by the use of compliance audits. Figure 2 indicates how these activities are mapped
and sequenced in STEALTH . This flow is described further below.
3.1.1 Tax transactions and ownership networks
We represent partnerships and asset exchanges using an ownership network. The
nodes in the network represent tax entities, while the edges represent ownership
relations between those entities. A transaction consists of a pair of actions in
opposite directions, each of which transfers an asset from one entity to another
entity. Each transaction alters the state of the network by updating the stateful
variables in the nodes. Moreover, each entity has a portfolio of assets that it owns.
An asset is transferred from the portfolio of one entity to the portfolio of another
entity. As an example consider a tax ecosystem with four entities, two taxpayers
(Taxpayer A and B) and two partnerships (Partnership P1 and P2) as shown in
Fig. 3a. The nodes in the network are entities, arrows are edges for ownership
relations and the dotted lines represent transactions. Taxpayer B buys a share in
Partnership P1 from Taxpayer A with cash. This transaction consists of two actions;
Action 1 transfers cash from Taxpayer B to Taxpayer A and Action 2 transfers a
partnership share from Taxpayer A to Taxpayer B. When the partnership share is
transferred to the Taxpayer B node, the Taxpayer A node is updated to show the
cash in its portfolio. In addition, the transaction results in income ($40k) for
Table 1 STEALTH glossary
Tax evasion view Tax auditing view
Agent Tax evader Auditor
Representation Tax scheme Audit score sheet
STEALTH input Transaction sequences and
ownership network
Audit score sheet
STEALTH output Deductible loss (dl) Audit score (s)
Fitness function dlð1 sÞ dlð1 sÞ
Audit score Risk of being audited Likelihood of auditing
Objective Minimize audit likelihood and
maximize deductible loss
Maximize likelihood of auditing a network of
transactions that generate high deductible loss
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Taxpayer A as the basis of the partnership share ($40k) is lower than the price
($80k) that Taxpayer B paid for the asset.
The network representation of our tax ecosystem allows us to record snapshots of
a sequence of transactions between multiple entities and calculate tax incurred per
entity, per transaction. Transactions happen sequentially, at any given time a
transaction will only take place between two given nodes. The network represen-
tation also makes our design modular. We can add different types of entities by
introducing more nodes in the network and similarly we can introduce more
diversity within nodes by having different types of assets.
The edges between nodes in the ownership network describe relationships in
enterprise structures. These may consist of parent-child subsidiary relationships,
spousal or family relationships or nested ownerships of entities (May 2012). For
example, as shown in Fig. 3, Taxpayer A owns a 4 % share of a partnership P1.
Similarly, partnership P1 has a 60 % share in partnership P2.
3.1.2 Integrating the tax law
Several actions are required to execute a transaction: (a) transaction feasibility
checks, (b) asset transfers within the ownership network and, (c) transaction tax
calculations. The tax law is imposed at each of these steps as follows:
Feasibility of a transaction Given a transaction consists of one action transferring
an asset from one entity to another entity, and another action transferring an asset
in the other direction, the tax law is checked to determine (a) if two assets can be
exchanged for each other (b) if the entity owns the asset that it is attempting to
Fig. 2 STEALTH tax ecosystem model transactions
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Example of transaction with a network representation showing relationship edges and network
state transition via a transaction. a Initial state and transaction. b Network state after transaction
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transfer and can transfer it and (c) if the receiving entity is allowed to receive the
asset.
Transfer of assets Evaluate rules regarding the transfer of assets, e.g. determine
how the basis of an underlying asset needs to be adjusted. A simplified decision
tree rule to evaluate basis changes due to asset transfer is shown in Fig. 4.
Calculate tax Check rules regarding the tax impact of a transaction, This is
implemented as a decision tree rule as shown in Fig. 5.
STEALTH can be extended not only by adding new entities and assets to the tax
ecosystem, but by also adding/modifying tax rules. This requires alteration to some
or all three parts of the transaction transfer actions.
3.1.3 Audit score sheets
In STEALTH an audit is a procedure that examines a sequence of transactions to
help identify suspicious events. Audits play two roles in STEALTH . First we use
Fig. 4 A decision tree rule to evaluate asset basis changes
Fig. 5 A decision tree rule that shows the tax calculation on an asset transfer
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them to help direct and co-adapt transaction sequences towards non-compliance (see
Sect. 3.4). Second, they are used to quantify the degree of evasion.
In addition to amendments to the IRC, the IRS issues tax guidance on matters
related to regulations, revenue rulings and revenue procedures using a number of
announcements and notices. These collective communications can be used to clarify
the intent of the tax code and determine specific transactions and/or transaction
types deemed to be in violation of certain regulatory statutes. Audits in
STEALTH are modeled based on this public information. E.g. in 2004 the IRC
§743 (a) was altered to read
The basis of partnership property shall not be adjusted as the result of (1) a
transfer of an interest in a partnership by sale or exchange or on the death of a
partner unless (2) the election provided by §754 (relating to optional
adjustment to basis of partnership property) is in effect with respect to such
partnership or (3) unless the partnership has a substantial built-in loss
immediately after such transfer.
This amendment is captured in STEALTH using the following observable
events: (a) the sale of a partnership interest in exchange for a taxable asset, (b) the
partnership whose shares are being transferred has not made a §754 election, and
(c) the seller’s basis with respect to the non-cash assets owned by the partnership
exceeds their FMV by more than $250; 000, the threshold for substantial built-in
loss.
To represent audits in STEALTH we use a list of audit points (weights),
corresponding to all observable events that can occur when a set of transactions is
executed. An audit score sheet is a collection of audit points, each corresponding to
a different type of event that may be present in a transaction. The higher the audit
points associated with a certain type of event, the more suspicious that type of event
is. In order to mirror the limited resources available for auditing we also constrain
the sum of audit points to equal one.
The audit score associated with an audit score sheet, is defined as the sum of all
of the audit points present in a sequence of transactions, multiplied by their
Table 2 Each row has three columns with (1) the type of observable corresponding to the three char-
acterized observables from the IRS notice, (2) the associated audit point and (3) the number of times it
occurs in a list of transactions
Observable Points Frequency
1 Point1 Frequency1
2 Point2 Frequency2
3 Point3 Frequency3
1 [ 2 Point1[2 Frequency1[2
1 [ 3 Point1[3 Frequency1[3
2 [ 3 Point2[3 Frequency2[3
1 [ 2 [ 3 Point1[2[3 Frequency1[2[3
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respective frequencies. Visually, audit score sheets can be represented by a
spreadsheet, with each row corresponding to a different type of audit observable, as
shown in Table 2. One can imagine a hypothetical auditor going through a
sequence of transactions and incrementing the frequency in the far right column
whenever each type of event is observed.
Using this formulation, we interpret an audit score as the likelihood that a
sequence of transactions will be audited. That is, the more types of transactions
associated with high levels of suspicion there are in a sequence of transactions, the
higher the audit score will be.
The events on the audit score sheet can range from basic facts about a
transaction, such as whether a material asset is being exchanged, to more complex
aspects of the model state, such as ownership linkages between multiple entities.
Note the representation of audit points relies on the presence of ‘‘observable’’
events. An observable event is one that is possible to detect in the tax ecosystem
model, but not necessarily by the auditor. For example, if a taxpayer purchases a
share in a partnership for cash, STEALTH will process that as a transaction
involving a partnership asset, as well as tracking all parties involved in the
transaction.
The usefulness of the audit point representation is not only to suggest important
qualifiers to the auditor, but to evaluate how hypothetical auditing behavior effects
future schemes. Thus, even if an event is completely unobservable by the auditor, it
can still be useful for STEALTH .
3.2 Simulation with tax ecosystem model
At the core of STEALTH is a simulation of the tax ecosystem model, shown in
Fig. 6. The simulation first initializes the tax ecosystem, which is a set of
interconnected taxpayers and partnerships, and takes as input a transaction sequence
and an audit score sheet with associated points for each observable.
Each transaction needs to be analyzed for legality/feasibility before it can be
executed. A simple check is to validate whether or not an entity has an asset before
Tax Evader
Auditor
Tax Evasion Scheme
Taxable 
Income
Audit Score Sheet
Audit
Score
0.2
0.3
0.5
Fig. 6 STEALTH tax ecosystem simulator
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it can be transferred. Feasibility checks are divided into two broad categories
namely impossible transactions and economically unviable transactions. Once
validated the model can perform the actual transactions between entities and
calculate the tax/deductible loss associated with the feasible and taxable transac-
tions. The new state of the ownership network is also then updated.
Simultaneously, each transaction sequence is assigned an audit score by
multiplying the observed financial activity against the prescribed audit score sheet.
The audit points can specify patterns that represent combinations of financial
activity that may indicate abuse to an auditor, such as when a certain type of
transaction occurs between two linked entities.
3.3 Optimization architecture
The optimization in STEALTH is orchestrated by the adversarial relationship between
tax schemes and audits. STEALTH performs co-evolution of a population of tax
schemeswith a population of audit score sheets, both ofwhich are evaluated in every step
against a sub-population of the opposite agent type as shown in Fig. 7. That is, each tax
scheme ‘‘selects’’ some audit score sheets to calculate its fitness against and vice-versa.
3.3.1 Co-evolution as a search heuristic
In biology, co-evolution describes situations where two or more species reciprocally
affect each other’s evolution. The notion of adversarial co-evolution from biology
can be used for the circumstances of the auditors, e.g. each time the IRS changes the
tax code the tax evaders react by finding new ambiguities. The auditor and the tax
evaders are co-evolving as interacting species, much like foxes and hares. The
auditor searches for beneficiaries of abusive tax shelters while the beneficiaries seek
Tax Evader
Auditor
Select & Vary 
Select & Vary
Tax Ecosystem
0.2 0.3 0.5
Fig. 7 Concurrent optimization of high likelihood audit scores and low risk tax schemes
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to evade the auditor. At its core, the overall dynamics of the system reflect a
constantly transitioning series of complementary adjustments, with each predator/
prey seeking to bring advantage to the predator/prey under adjustment. A principle
that arguably explains the constant evolutionary arms race between the iterative tax
shelter pattern and IRS reaction is the ‘‘Red Queen Principle’’ (Van 1973): a
species (in this case the IRS or the tax evaders) must continually adapt to maintain
its relative fitness among the species it co-evolves with.
One algorithm which is used for co-evolutionary modeling is the Genetic
Algorithm (GA) (Goldberg 1989). It is a stochastic, adaptive learning heuristic
which searches and scores a number of solutions (individuals) in parallel. The GA
draws inspiration from the fundamental principles of population adaptation through
inheritance, selection and genetic variation in neo-Darwinian evolution. In the GA
‘‘individuals’’ are represented as fixed length bit strings and evaluated for fitness,
good ones are selected as parents, and new ones are created by inheritance with
variation as illustrated in Fig. 8.
The GA performs a search on networks of transactions to find the specific
sequence of transactions that maximize a fitness score. A tax scheme generated by
the GA is represented by a list of integers. A parser is used to read these integers and
generate a network of transactions with the help of a grammar. The transactions
consist of a list of Java interpretable objects that are input to a tax ecosystem model
to calculate the resulting taxable gain. There are two populations of individual
solutions: sequences of transactions and sets of audit points. The mechanics of co-
evolution are identical to a standard GA, except the fitness for each individual is
calculated with a k size subset of the opposite population. Simultaneous changes of
the networks of transactions and audit points are shown in Fig. 7. In order to
generate both a final tax value and an audit score, the tax simulator in
Fig. 8 Overview of the flow of
a Genetic Algorithm
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STEALTH must take both a network of transactions and audit points as inputs. As
each transaction in the network is executed, the tax simulator updates the audit
score, given the audit points associated with the observed events.
3.4 Rewarding co-evolution
The reward assigned to individual solutions in co-evolutionary search can be
quantified with the help of a ‘‘fitness’’ function. From the perspective of a tax
evader, two terms effect a tax scheme’s fitness function. First, the fitness should be
positively correlated with the deductible loss, in other words a tax scheme is only
effective if it results in a high deductible loss. The second term in the function
represents the likelihood of the audit disallowing the tax benefits gained from the
scheme. This term takes into account the likelihood of an audit (the audit score) and
the amount of tax that is evaded. Ideally the audit score should be low to reduce the
likelihood of an audit.
The objective of auditors is essentially the opposite. They seek to maximize the
likelihood of audit for a sequence of transactions with high deductible loss, relative
to other transaction sequences observed in the population. By considering fitness in
this manner, we are able to take into account both the effectiveness of tax schemes
from a purely tax perspective, as well as from a risk perspective.
Further details of the fitness functions are described in Appendix 6. In Sect. 4 we
investigate how STEALTH concurrently searches for co-adapting tax schemes and
audit scores.
4 Experiments with STEALTH
We demonstrate how tax schemes and audit scores co-evolve in STEALTH by
using a known artificial basis step-up tax scheme. The aim of the experiments is to
demonstrate that STEALTH can search simultaneously for tax schemes and audit
scores as they mutually adapt to one another over time. The results demonstrate that
STEALTH has the required fundamental components and processes for detecting
and anticipating tax evasion.
4.1 iBOB : an artificial basis step-up scheme
For the purposes of these experiments, we consider a particular known tax
scheme called Installment Sale Bogus Optional Basis (iBOB). In iBOB , a devious
taxpayer arranges a network of transactions designed to reduce his deductible loss
upon the eventual sale of an asset owned by one of his subsidiaries. He does this by
stepping up the basis of this asset according to the rules set forth in §743 (b) of the
tax code. In this way, he manages to eliminate taxable gain while ostensibly
remaining within the bounds of the tax law (GAO 2013).
The sequence of transactions for the iBOB scheme are enumerated below and
also shown graphically in Fig. 9.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 9 The steps in the iBOB abusive tax avoidance scheme. The basis of an asset is artificially stepped
up and tax is avoided by using ‘‘pass-through’’ entities. a iBOB step 1. b iBOB step 2. c iBOB step 3
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1. Mr. Jones is a 99 %partner in JonesCo and FamilyTrust, whereas JonesCo is itself
a 99 %partner in another partnership, NewCo. NewCo owns a hotelwith a current
fair market value (FMV) of $200. If NewCo decides to sell the hotel at step 1
(Fig. 9a), Mr. Jones will incur a tax from this sale. The tax that Mr. Jones owes is
the difference between the FMVatwhich the hotel was sold and his share of inside
basis in this hotel, i.e. $198-$119 = $79. Mr. Jones can evade or indefinitely defer
this tax by artificially stepping up the inside basis of the hotel to $198.
2. In the next step (Fig. 9b), we see that FamilyTrust, which Mr. Jones controls,
decides to buy JonesCo’s partnership share in NewCo for a promissory note
with a face value of $198. Of course, FamilyTrust has no intention of paying off
this note, as any such payments entail a tax burden upon NewCo. Having
already made a §754 election, FamilyTrust can now step up its share of inside
basis in the hotel to $198.
3. When NewCo sells the Hotel to Mr.Brown for $200 (Fig. 9b), Mr. Jones does
not incur any tax, as the difference between the current market value and his
share of inside basis in the hotel is now zero.
4.2 Parameter settings in STEALTH experiments
To run STEALTH we need to specify the initial ownership network of tax entities, the
grammar for transactions, the audit score sheet and the co-evolutionary search parameters.
We initialize a network with two tax filers, Mr. Jones and Mr. Brown, and three
partnerships, JonesCo, NewCo, and FamilyTrust. These entities have portfolios of
assets that include Cash, an Annuity, a Hotel, and various partnership shares. The
assets can have different fair market values.
The Backus-Naur Form (BNF) grammar (see Appendix 6) used by STEALTH is
detailed in Fig. 10. The first recursive rule in the grammar shows that the search
space (language) is bounded only by the length of the input (genome) used to map
integers to transactions. We also note that the search space can be increased and
biased by altering the structure of the grammar.
In addition to iBOB , we note two additional patterns of transaction activity that
can result in zero immediate tax liability for Mr Jones. The first of these involves the
<transactions>::=<transactions><transaction> | <transaction>
<transaction>::=Transaction(<entity>,<entity>,<Asset>,<Asset>)
<entity>::=Brown|NewCo|Jones|JonesCo|FamilyTrust
<Asset>::=<Cash>|<Material>|<Annuity>|<PartnershipAsset>
<Cash>::=Cash(<Cvalue>)
<Material>::=Material(200,Hotel,1)
<Annuity>::=Annuity(<Avalue>,30)
<PartnershipAsset>::=PartnershipAsset(99,<Pname>)
<Share>::=Share(<Sshare>)
<Cvalue>::=200|300|100
<Avalue>::=200|300|100
<Pname>::=NewCo|JonesCo|FamilyTrust
<Sshare>::=30|50|20
Fig. 10 iBOB BNF grammar for STEALTH
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transfer of a partnership interest between two ‘‘linked’’ entities in the same
enterprise structure, usually resulting in a basis adjustment due to an earlier §754
election. By ‘‘linked’’ we mean a transaction in which the two parties are connected
by an ownership relationship. In the iBOB context, these include ‘‘singly linked’’
transactions, such as those that may occur between Mr Jones and JonesCo (or
JonesCo and NewCo), and ‘‘doubly linked’’ transactions, as may occur between Mr
Jones and NewCo. These types of transactions result in zero immediate tax liability
for all parties, but would almost certainly be audited. The second such transaction
involves the use of Annuities such as promissory notes that are taxed only at the
time of payment. As with ‘‘linked’’ transactions, defaulting on Annuity payments is
nominally legal and results in zero tax liability but can be very suspicious for
auditors.
4.3 Results: co-evolution of iBOB
We conducted a number of experiments to verify that the co-evolutionary dynamics
of STEALTH are consistent and suffice to find existing tax schemes. We expect that
as these schemes evolve to accommodate existing audit priorities, the audit points
will themselves evolve to detect the new abusive behavior. This should result in
either convergent or oscillatory dynamics.
Experiment 1 shows that when there is no audit observable that can capture the
tax scheme, the non observable tax scheme population converges to the tax
scheme that cannot be observed. Experiment 2 shows that if the tax scheme is
observable, then the audit points will converge to detect it. Finally in Experiment 3
we add an extra constraint to the audit observables such that exactly one of the audit
points must be zero. This constraint aids the representation of limited audit
resources.
In co-evolution, we are interested in not only the end-result tax scheme and audit
score distribution but also the dynamics that emerge between the two. Evaluating
the fitness levels of both populations and subsets of those populations over each
sequential generation can more accurately display the effects that the evolution of
one population has on the other. This is an important goal when trying to anticipate
tax schemes and audit points.
For the experiments considered here, STEALTH represents audit scores as the
sum of four audit points between 0 and 1. The initial average distribution of audit
scores in the population for each experiment is shown in Table 3. The value of each
Table 3 Each row lists an audit observable. Each column lists an experiment and the corresponding
initial average distribution of audit points in the population
Audit observable Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
iBOB 0 0.25 0.25
Annuity 0.33 0.25 0.25
Linked 0.33 0.25 0.25
Double linked 0.33 0.25 0.25
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audit point can be thought of as the relative importance of the associated transaction
to the auditor.
We ran 100 independent iterations of the co-evolutionary GA for 100 generations
each with tax scheme and audit score populations of size 100. We chose 0.5 of the
tax scheme population for evaluating the fitness of the solution in the other audit
score population and vice-versa. The parameters that govern the GA simulation are
enumerated in Table 4.
4.3.1 Experiment 1: audit observables that do not detect iBOB
For this experiment we purposefully left out audit points that can detect iBOB .
Thus, once iBOB is found it will propagate through the tax scheme population on
the merit of being the best tax scheme that is unauditable.
Figure 11 shows plots of tax scheme and audit score sheet fitness. Figure 11a
shows the fitnesses of both the tax schemes and the audit scores for the best
individual from each generation for a single iteration. Note, while iBOB was found
in only 34 % of the iterations here, we expect most iterations to converge to
iBOB as the number of generations increases. The average audit point values
displayed in Fig. 11b show the variation in the points over time. Note here the audit
points are unchanged and in equilibrium once iBOB has been found. The average
audit points of the best solutions for all the iterations are shown in Fig. 11c, where
we see that transactions that exchange a material for an annuity are assigned a
higher audit point.
Material-annuity transactions have a significantly higher audit point because they
occur more frequently than the other two transactions. That is, any transaction in
which the Hotel is exchanged for an annuity mitigates all of the taxable gain on the
ultimate sale of the hotel because annuities are non-taxable. Furthermore, a double
link transaction requires that a material-annuity transaction takes place because
Jones has to purchase the Hotel from NewCo with an annuity. Thus, the likelihood
of a tax scheme involving a material-annuity transaction is higher than the
likelihood of a single or double linked transaction based scheme. This results in a
higher average audit point assigned to material-annuity transactions because it is the
most common way to mitigate taxable gain in our example.
A clear pattern emerges when iBOB is evolved: initially, the pool of tax schemes
gravitates towards a sequence of transactions that contains suspicious activity,
Table 4 Parameters for the STEALTH iBOB experiments
Parameter Description Value
Mutation rate Probability of integer change in individual 0.1
Crossover rate Probability of combining two individual integer strings 0.7
Tournament Size Number of competitors when determining most fit individuals 2
Number chosen Fraction of other population that each individual is tested against 0.5
Population size Number of individuals in each population 100
Generations Number of times populations are evaluated 100
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which the audit scores are able to detect. Only after the audit scores evolve to reduce
the fitness of such schemes does iBOB become dominant.
Two distinct metastable states emerge when the basic iBOB is not found. The
most common is when a suspicious scheme is evolved in an early generation, which
the audit scores can effectively detect early on, causing the scheme fitness to
converge towards its minimum and the audit score fitness to converge to its
maximum. Alternatively, the pools of both tax schemes and audit scores oscillate in
respect to each other for the duration of the run, implying a process of suspicious
schemes emerging and audit scores evolving to detect them, causing another
suspicious scheme to become dominant. Many runs show oscillations or long-lived
transients, as these show the kind of predator-prey dynamics we expect, and
illustrate that the search can sometimes get stuck in a ‘metastable state’.
The transient behaviors that occur before the simulation ultimately settles into
iBOB . The transients can exhibit oscillations into unstable or weakly
metastable equilibria, and can sometimes get stuck for a while in one of these
equilibria where the scheme fitness is low and the audit fitness is high. We know the
only stable configuration is one in which iBOB dominates the population – any
‘‘oscillations’’, whatever the intervals between transient peaks, and whatever the
number of those peaks (1,2,3...) must eventually give way to iBOB.
4.3.2 Experiment 2: audit observables that can detect iBOB
In this experiment we include an audit point that can detect iBOB . Thus,
iBOB should not be able to propagate through the tax scheme population. Because
the audit score sheets were previously unable to detect iBOB, the fitness of the tax
schemes would only oscillate until a single iBOB scheme was introduced into the
population, at which point it would quickly propagate.
Figure 12a displays the fitnesses of both the tax schemes and the audit score
sheets from the best individual from each generation from one iteration. Since the
audit points completely cover all transactions that can create large recognizable loss,
the fitness is always minimal for the tax schemes and maximal for audit score
sheets. The corresponding audit points for the iteration are all constant as shown in
Fig. 12b. Furthermore, Fig. 12c shows that the average audit points of the best
individuals over all the runs corresponds to the expected values at the initial state.
We conclude that the observed co-evolutionary dynamics of STEALTH are
consistent with expectations for this example.
4.3.3 Experiment 3: sustained oscillatory dynamics of fitness values in STEALTH
Our goal with this set of experiments was to generate sustained oscillatory
dynamics, since we have shown in previous experiments that oscillations in tax
scheme fitness are possible for a short amount of time before converging to
bFig. 11 Evolution of iBOB in STEALTH Experiment 1. a Best fitness for one run. b Distribution of
audit points for one run. c Distribution of audit points averaged over runs
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equilibrium. This is a necessary step because a primary assumption underlying our
model is that tax schemes and audit scores sheets are engaged in a perpetual co-
evolutionary process in which no global attractor exists. Because the audit score
sheets were unable to detect iBOB in Experiment 1, the fitness of the tax schemes
would only oscillate until a single iBOB scheme was introduced into the population,
at which point it would quickly propagate. At the same time, simply allowing the
audit score sheets to detect iBOB would result in rapidly convergent dynamics, as
demonstrated in Experiment 2.
To generate sustaining oscillations, we augment the audit score sheets to assign
the lowest audit point a value of zero, so that there will always be at least one
scheme that is not detectable by the auditor. Our hypothesis is that once the
population of audit score sheets begins to converge, a tax scheme will evolve that
utilizes the type of behavior that is currently not detectable by the majority of audit
score sheets. The effective tax scheme will propagate within its population until the
audit score sheets gradually evolve to detect the now dominant behavior.
Figure 13a displays the fitnesses of both the tax schemes and the audit scores
from the best individual from each generation during a single iteration. In this
scenario, since the audit points cannot completely cover all the transactions that can
create large deductible loss the fitness oscillates between minimal for the tax
schemes and maximal for audit score sheets and vice versa. The audit points
corresponding to this iteration also oscillate as shown in Fig. 13b. In Fig. 13c we
see for the reasons listed in Sect. 4.3.1 that the highest average audit points of the
best individuals over all the iterations are for transactions involving annuities.
In Fig. 13, there is at first a high level of fitness among tax schemes across all
runs, but the initial dominant scheme is quickly detected by the corresponding audit
score sheet population, which decreases the overall fitness. Over time, new tax
schemes emerge in some of the runs that are initially not detectable by the
corresponding audit score sheet population, which generates a rapid upward surge in
tax scheme fitness. At closer inspection we see that the proportion of certain tax
schemes follow the existence of the highest fitness audit score sheet. We observe
that an audit score sheet capable of sufficiently auditing a certain type of tax
scheme can co-exist with that scheme for some time until the frequency of that tax
strategy starts to decline. This demonstrates (a) the successful audit score sheet
taking time to propagate amongst its population and (b) the jagged fitness landscape
of the transaction sequences. The audit score sheets eventually evolve to detect the
type of behavior that is present in the new dominant tax schemes, but the process is
more gradual. These results confirm our hypothesis that under the correct
conditions, sustained oscillatory dynamics in the fitness of tax schemes are possible.
While the experiments were designed to generate oscillatory behavior, the results
are promising because they show realistic dynamics between the tax schemes and
the corresponding auditing priorities. Specifically we can see that once a single new
tax scheme emerges that is not currently detectable by the auditor, it propagates
bFig. 12 Evolution of iBOB in STEALTH experiment 2. a Best fitness for one run. b Distribution of audit
points for one run. c Distribution of audit points averaged over runs
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throughout the population very quickly, as evident by the steep upward slope in the
average scheme fitness plot. Conversely, the audit score sheets take a longer time to
adapt to the new tax scheme. This dynamic mirrors the reality of actual audits.
4.3.4 HiBOB: iBOB with hierarchical enterprise structures
In an attempt to find potentially new evasion schemes, we added a hierarchy of
multiple partnerships to the SCOTE tax ecosystem with the initial ownership
structure shown in Fig. 14a. Here, NewCo owns 99% of FunCo, who in turn owns
bFig. 13 Evolution of iBOB in STEALTH experiment 3. a Best fitness for one run. b Distribution of audit
points for one run. c Distribution of audit points averaged over runs
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 14 The steps in the HiBOB tax scheme, a hierarchical extension of iBOB. a HiBOB base.
b HiBOB1. c HiBOB2
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99% of LQNH, who in turn now owns the Hotel. We postulated the emergence of 2
interesting transaction sequences utilizing this hierarchy, one that is evasive and the
other benign:
HiBOB1 HiBOB1 is almost identical to the original iBOB: FamilyTrust
purchases FunCo’s share in LQNH for an annuity and invokes a §754 election,
mitigating all capital gains on the eventual sale of the Hotel, as shown in
Fig. 14b. HiBOB1 is a derivative of the original iBOB because they both result in
zero tax liability and involve the sale of an entity’s stake in a partnership that
directly owns the material asset being sold.
HiBOB2 HiBOB2 is characterized by the purchase of a partnership asset by
FamilyTrust further up the partnership chain. That is, instead of FamilyTrust
purchasing a share in LQNH, the entity that owns the Hotel, they instead purchase
NewCo’s share in FunCo, as shown in Fig. 14c. Because §754 elections only
affect the assets of the partnership that is being purchased, the inside basis of the
Hotel in respect to FamilyTrust is not adjusted and there is subsequently no tax
benefit. This is true of all transactions that purchase partnership assets that do not
directly own the Hotel. For example, the same result would be accomplished if
FamilyTrust purchased JonesCo’s share in NewCo.
We ran the simulation 100 times with a population of size 500 for 100
generations with fixed audit weights to determine the ability of STEALTH to
discover these more complex transaction sequences. The audit observables were
fixed as for Experiment 1. HiBOB1 was found by the model over the course of all
100 runs. However HiBOB2 was not found by STEALTH in any of the runs. While
this result demonstrates the ability of STEALTH to distinguish between the HiBOB
types it also indicates the need for a smoother solution landscape to allow for
exploration of a larger variety of potential schemes.
5 Conclusions and future work
We developed a novel search heuristic called STEALTH that can simulate the co-
evolution of abusive tax schemes and audit scores. STEALTH is based on an
intuitive time evolving graph-based representation; entities are represented as nodes
with assets, edges are ownership relations between entities and transactions are
transfers of assets between nodes. STEALTH does not mine data and is
fundamentally based on evaluating and exploring rules. As such, STEALTH is a
complement to traditional data driven machine learning techniques. Since the
STEALTH output provides a readable and intuitive understanding of how
transactions can be sequenced to achieve tax evasion it can be used to inform
both supervised and unsupervised learning methods. Moreover, STEALTH has the
advantage that it allows search of both transactions given a fixed audit score sheet
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and the fine tuning of audit scores given fixed transactions. Thus it can be used to
determine audit points that are successful in finding suspicious large loss
deductions.
While promising, the experiments that have been conducted using our current
implementation have been limited. Given iBOB as an initial starting point and
assigning its most basic manifestation a high audit likelihood, a genetic algorithm is
able to find variants such as the HiBOB scheme in a significant portions of runs.
That being said, we constrain the search in a few non-trivial ways, such as by
limiting the generative grammar. Limiting the grammar, while indicative of the
model’s inability to find an acceptable local maxima without help, demonstrates
how the addition of expert knowledge can be incorporated into the search without
changing the source code. By choosing the types of assets that are exchanged, the
number of partnerships that can be formed and which entities engage in
transactions, our search can be catered to the situation at hand, greatly increasing
its efficiency.
We showed that STEALTH can generate oscillatory dynamics between tax
schemes and the audit score sheets designed to detect them. Co-evolutionary
algorithms often generate intricate run-time behaviors that make it difficult to
monitor progress towards a goal. Furthermore, potential gradient loss (disengage-
ment) of the search can occur here. This happens when the distribution of fitness
values in at least one population is almost flat. For example, if audit points are made
too ‘‘tough’’, no transaction sequences are able to pass the audit score sheet.
Additional precautions need to be taken to avoid mediocre stable states or relative
over-generalization, which favors versatile components over those of the optimal
solution.
The current drawbacks of STEALTH is that it has a very simplified view of
transactions, audit points and the tax law. Our next step is to increase the complexity
of both the transactions that compose the tax schemes and the types of activities that
are detectable by the audit score sheets. Examples here include logic to handle
(a) other deferred payment structures and loans/repurchase agreements, (b) asset
’leakage’ such as when transactions post to international destinations and
(c) automatic detection of patterns that emerge from tax schemes to help derive
audit score sheets.
A sensitivity analysis of the STEALTH algorithm is also required to ascertain the
stability of convergence to variations in input parameters and run-time settings.
Calculation of externalities such as the Fair Market Value can also have significant
uncertainty that can impact auditing cost and efficiency. A sweep of the distribution
of values here would help evaluate the robustness of audit sheet thresholds.
Ultimately we seek to evaluate the schemes generated by STEALTH against tax
return data and solicit feedback from domain experts.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Genetic Algorithm
Co-evolutionary search heuristics (de Jong et al. 2007; Ficici and Bucci 2007;
Wiegand and Potter 2006; Stanley and Miikkulainen 2004) evaluate an individual
solution based on interactions between populations of multiple solutions. The
individual solution may appear good in one context and poor in another context, e.g.
one solution’s ranking in a population can change depending on other solutions.
The control flow of a Genetic Algorithm search is shown in Fig. 8 The steps in a
single iteration (generation) are:
1. Initialize Input the initial solutions, e.g. uniformly randomly generated input
sequences.
2. Evaluate The individual solutions are evaluated and assigned a score (fitness)
according to some function.
3. Select Some individuals from the current population are included in a new
population.
4. Variation Individuals in the new population are modified by some operators,
e.g. crossover and mutation.
5. Replacement Update the current population with the new population.
6. Termination Stop if a termination criteria is met.
7. Iterate Return to step 2.
6.1.1 Grammatical evolution
Grammatical Evolution (GE) is a version of the Genetic Algorithm with a variable
length integer representation and a compressed form of indirect mapping using a
grammar (O’Neill andRyan 2003).We canmap to a transaction sequence bymeans of
a grammar which conveniently expresses all possible transaction sequences
compactly. GE has an explicit mapping step (genotype-to-phenotype) and biases the
search by changing the grammar, e.g. alter the search space size and reduce source
code modification. The grammar rewrites the input (genotype) to the output (pheno-
type), as shown in Fig. 15. Recursive rules in the grammar indicate that the search
space (language) is bounded only by the length of the input (genome) used in rewriting.
In GE, the compressed form of the search space is represented by a Backus-Naur
Form (BNF) grammar which defines the language that describes the possible output
sentences. A BNF grammar has terminal symbols, non-terminal symbols, a start
symbol and production rules for rewriting non-terminal symbols. The grammar is
used in a generative approach and the production rules are applied to each non-
terminal, beginning with the start symbol, until a complete program is formed. The
list of integers (genotype) rewrites the start symbol into a sentence. An integer from
the list of integers is used to choose a production rule from the current non-terminal
symbol by taking the current integer input and the modulo of the current number of
production choices. Each time a production from a rule with more than one
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production choice is selected to rewrite a non-terminal, the next integer is read and
the system traverses the genome. The rewriting is complete when the sentence
comprises only terminal symbols.
In Fig. 15 there is an example of the rewriting of an integer list (genotype) to a
sentence (phenotype) describing a transaction between two entities that exchange
assets.
1. We pick the first rule in the grammar as the start symbol, in this case
(1)\transactions[.
2. Expand the left most non-terminal symbol in our sentence \transac-
tions[. We take the current integer input 3 and the modulo of the number of
production choices 2, which is 1, thus we pick \transaction[ the
production choice at position 1 (the indexing starts at 0) and rewrite the
\transactions[with\transaction[.
3. Again expand the left most non-terminal symbol\transaction[. There is
only one production choice here, so it is rewritten to Transaction(\en-
tity[,\entity[,\Asset[,\Asset[).
4. Again expand the left most non-terminal symbol\entity[. We take the
current integer input 11 and the modulo of the number of production choices 5,
which is 1, thus we pick NewCo. The sentence is now Transac-
tion(NewCo,\entity[,\Asset[,\Asset[).
5. The left most non-terminal symbol is again\entity[. We take the current
integer input 10 and the modulo of the number of production choices 5, which
is 0, thus we pick Brown. The sentence is now Transaction(NewCo,
Brown,\Asset[,\Asset[).
6. The left most non-terminal symbol is now\Asset[. We take the current
integer input 4 and the modulo of the number of production choices 3, which is
1, thus we pick \Material[. The sentence is now Transac-
tion(NewCo, Brown,\Material[,\Asset[).
Fig. 15 Example of mapping a list of integers (Genotype) into a list of transactions (Phenotype) by using
grammatical evolution
176 E. Hemberg et al.
123
7. The left most non-terminal symbol is now \Material[. There are no
choices for\Material[so we rewrite it with Material(200, Hotel,
1). The sentence is now Transaction(NewCo, Brown, Mate-
rial(200, Hotel, 1),\Asset[).
8. The left most non-terminal symbol is again\Asset[. We take the current
integer input 30 and the modulo of the number of production choices 3, which
is 0, thus we pick\Cash[. The sentence is now Transaction(NewCo,
Brown, Material(200, Hotel, 1),\Cash[).
9. The left most non-terminal symbol is now \Material[. There are no
choices for\Cash[ so we rewrite it with Cash(\Cvalue[). The sentence
is now Transaction(NewCo, Brown, Material(200, Hotel, 1),
Cash(\CValue[).
10. The left most non-terminal symbol is Cash(\CValue[. We take the current
integer input 7 and the modulo of the number of production choices 3, which is
1, thus we pick 200. The sentence is now Transaction(NewCo, Brown,
Material(200, Hotel, 1), Cash(200).
11. There are no more non-terminal symbols left to rewrite and our string
rewriting is done.
6.2 STEALTH formalism
This section describes STEALTH in a more formal notation in order to define the
distinct scope of the approach.
6.2.1 Model of tax ecosystem
The ownership network at a given time is defined as a list of entities, each of which
owns a set of assets. At any point, the state of the network can be described as some
c 2 C, where c ¼ fe; a; dg, where e ¼ feigk1i¼0 is the set of entities, a ¼ faigk2i¼0 is the
set of all assets and k1; k2 2 Zþ; ei 2 E; ai 2 A. The operator d determines the owner
of each asset, i.e d : A 7!E, where A is the space of assets and E is the space of entities.
Next we define a sequence of transactions as a vector t ¼ ftigki¼0 for some
k 2 Zþ, t 2 T is the space of all transactions. A transaction is defined as
t ¼ fef ; et; af ; atg, where ef ; et 2 E are two entities and af ; at 2 A are two assets that
are being exchanged between the two entities.
For audits, suppose that there are n specific types of events that are observable,
represented by fbigni¼0. Associated with each type of event are the audit points
faigni¼0; a 2 R and the frequency that the event occurs within a network of
transactions ffigni¼0; fi 2 Zþ. We can then write the audit score, s corresponding to
the audit score sheet and network of transactions as
s ¼
Xn
i¼0
ai  fi where
Xn
i¼0
ai ¼ 1
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We observe that laws governing a given transaction depend on the ‘‘type’’ of
assets and entities being exchanged. For example, the laws governing the exchange
of a hotel for cash between two taxpayers are different from those governing the
contribution of an annuity to a partnership in exchange for a share. Thus, we can
determine the laws governing a given transaction by the combination of both asset
and entity types.
6.2.2 Simulation of tax ecosystem
Consider the abstract transaction t ¼ ðef ; et; af ; atÞ, which states that entity ef gives
et the asset af in exchange for at. Define E^ to be the finite set of entity types, and A^
to be the finite set of asset types. We can then write the set of all transactions as a
union of disjoint subsets T ¼ [ni¼0Ti, where each subset contains all transactions of
a certain combination of asset and entity types. The steps that follow are.
1. a transaction type t is first checked to see if it is within the bounds of the legal/
feasible region by first determining to which subset Ti it belongs. We define
l : Ti 7!U as a map from a subset Ti 2 T to U that determines the laws / that
govern the transaction, given its combination of asset/entity types.
2. the transfers in the two actions composing the transaction represent the
transition of the network state ct to ctþ1 and ctþ1 to ctþ2 according to the map
s : T  C7!C
3. taxable gain/loss calculation takes a transaction t and a network state ct and
maps it to a deductible loss value dL for each taxable entity and an updated
network state, P : T  C 7!R C
6.2.3 Optimization of tax ecosystem
We can describe the process by which sequences of transactions and initial ownership
network are generated by defining a grammar Nt : Z
n
þ7!T  C that maps a list of n
integers to an element in the set of sequences of transaction (T) and an element in the
set of all ownership networks (C). Thus, for any x 2 Znþ,NtðxÞ ¼ t; c0Þð where t 2 T is
a sequence of transactions and c0 2 C is an initial network.
We can now define the space of auditing observables as W, where for some
m 2 Zþ,
W ¼ fbigmi¼0 : bi 2 ½0; 1 and
Xm
i¼0
bi ¼ 1
( )
 Rmþ
The grammar Na : Z
m
þ7!W maps a vector y 2 Zmþ to an element in the set of auditing
behavior.
The tax ecosystem is defined as a function F : T  CW 7!R2þ that takes as
input a sequence of transactions, an initial network state and auditing observables,
and generates a network state and audit score. Contained within the network state is
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the deductible loss dL. In other words, for any t 2 T and c0 2 C generated from the
same vector of integers x and accompanying auditing observables w 2 W,
F t; c0;wÞ ¼ dL; sð Þð
The function F can be broken up into a network of transition functions that has
the same length as the number of transactions in the transaction set contained within
the function call (k). Each transition function generates a new network state and an
audit score. So for all i 2 ½0; k, Fi ti; ci;wð Þ ¼ ciþ1; si
 
where s ¼ sk
The goal of the tax evader is to minimize audit likelihood and maximize
recognizable loss. First of all, each set of transactions generates a deductible loss,
dL. Secondly an audit score sheet generates an audit score, s based on a network of
transactions, which represents the likelihood that a scheme will be audited, i.e. the
risk of being audited. Thus, we can represent the fitness function, he for a tax
evasion scheme, given a specific audit score sheet, as he ¼ dLð1 sÞ
The goal of the auditor is to maximize the likelihood of an audit of a network of
transactions with high deductible loss. The fitness function for an audit score sheet
given a specific tax scheme is the same as that shown above, but with the opposite sign
ha ¼ he ¼ dLð1 sÞ (where a negative deductible loss value indicates positive
taxable gain). Recalling that each audit score sheet evaluates a population of
transaction sequences, an individual can determine sequences with relatively low
levels of taxable gain. Thus, an audit score sheet is fit in the event that it assigns: 1) high
audit likelihood to transaction sequences with relatively low levels of taxable gain and
2) low audit likelihood to sequences with normal or high levels of taxable gain.
We describe how to judge the fitness of a network of transactions t and an
auditing behavior w based on the deductible loss dL and audit score s generated from
the tax ecosystem model F. We can now also define the fitness function h : R2þ7!R
as such he dL; sð Þ ¼ dLð1 sÞ.
Now it is possible to fully define the maximizing objectives of networks of
transactions as
argmax
x2X
he F NtðxÞ;NaðyÞð Þð Þ½ 
¼ arg max
t2T;c
0
2C
he F t
; c0;w
   
Over all y 2 Bðy^; r1Þ for some y^ 2 Zmþ, where Bðy^; r1Þ is a ball of radius r1 2 Rþ
around y^. This represents the fact that the goal of the GA is to find local maxima
around some subset of auditing behavior, rather than attempting to search the entire
U space. Conversely, the objective for the auditing behaviors is to maximize the
positive ha function, the opposite of the objective for the transactions, i.e. the goal is
arg max
y2Zmþ
ha F NtðxÞ;NaðyÞÞÞ ¼ arg max
w2W
ha F t;c0;w
ð ÞÞð½

Over all x 2 Bðx^; r2Þ for some x^ 2 X^, where Bðx^; r2Þ is a ball of radius r2 2 Rþ
around x^. Similar to the previous objective function, this represents the fact that the
EA only searches for local maxima around a subset of all transaction sets and initial
model states.
Detecting tax evasion: a co-evolutionary approach 179
123
6.3 STEALTH software architecture
The UML diagrams in Figs. 16 and 17 shows the central classes defined in
STEALTH and their relationships. The Graph class contains all the entities and
assets. The GraphTransformer transitions the network from one state to the
Fig. 16 STEALTH UML diagram of the central classes
Fig. 17 STEALTH UML diagram assets and entities classes
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other by performing a Transaction consisting of two Assets and Entities,
checking the Legality of it and calculating the corresponding entries in the
AuditScoreSheet.
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